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Introduction
This work analyzes the entry problem in the hydroelectric generation industry. The operation of a generator upstream regularizes the river flow for generators located downstream on the same river, increasing the production capacity of the latter.
1 This positive externality increases the attractiveness of the locations downstream whenever a generator decides to enter upstream. Therefore, the entry decision of a generator in a given location may affect all entry decisions in locations downstream. I first model the problem of generators located in cascade on the same river to show the positive effect of the externality. Next, I develop a method to estimate an entry model specific to the hydro generation industry which takes into account the externality of the entry decisions. The specificity of the method derives from technological characteristics of hydro generation, and significantly simplify the estimation when compared to more standard entry models. Finally, I use a data set on investment decisions of Brazilian hydro-generators to estimate the model.
The empirical results show that firms have a positive incentive to locate downstream and that location characteristics matter on the decision to enter. The externality has a positive effect on entry decisions and is an increasing function of the regularization of the river flow done by the upstream plants, and a decreasing function of the distance between them.
In rivers with several available locations there is also an incentive to locate downstream, since entrants take into account the probability that entry occur in the locations upriver.
The physical and geographical characteristics of each location also play a strong role in the entrant's decision. The model identifies a pattern on the entry dynamics of new hydrogenerators: once someone enters in a given location, entry becomes more likely to happen on the downstream locations of that same river.
The year effects estimates of the entry model capture the variation in market conditions for the different years covered by the sample, and can be understood as an average for the non-observable prices of the bilateral contracts, that governs most of the electricity trade. 1 In this context, regularization means a reduction in the variance of the river flow.
Interestingly, these estimates show an improvement in market conditions one year before the crisis of 2001, when spot prices reached unprecedent high levels (see Figure 3 ). It indicates that the market anticipated the net excess demand that would take place in the months to come. This conclusion has three strong implications. First, it contradicts the government's claim that the crisis was due to an unexpected drought. If the crisis was truly unexpected, no anticipation would exist. Second, despite high sunk costs and uncertainty about future market conditions, investments in hydro-generation did respond to an expected excess demand, which absolves the market design of any blame for ineffectiveness. In fact, the crisis happened due to the length of time required for new plants to begin operating. Last, despite the fact that the market anticipated the crisis, the centralized dispatch algorithm failed in preventing it. Few months before the crisis the ISO was still dispatching the hydro plants instead of turning on the thermo generators.
I take advantage of information on the entry order to analyze one commonly used assumption in the empirical literature on entry: that entry occurs at the same time. Since my data set has information on the entry order I estimate the model with both the entry order and without it. The results show that not taking the entry order into account, and estimating a one shot entry game where everyone enter at the same time, overestimates the externality effect and the interactions of the agents.
Background
The Brazilian electricity industry has undergone major reforms during the 90's. A broad privatization and deregulation process changed the industry from a state-owned vertically integrated monopoly to a private industry separated in the three different segments of generation, transmission and distribution. The main purposes of the reforms were to increase efficiency and to attract private capital to the sector.
Among the major changes was the creation of a market for long term contracts of electricity supply, as a way to introduce competition in the generation segment. Generators would be free to negotiate contracts with consumers, which would create competition for better deals. The market would provide incentive for efficient behavior on the firm's side and would have a price that would work as a signal for new investments in electricity generation.
In 2001, five years after the reforms took place, Brazil went through its most severe energy crisis ever. An unexpected dry Summer 2 caught the water levels of the dams of the Brazilian system at an already low level leading to a water shortage that culminated in a rationing of electricity consumption with penalties for over-consumption. Unclear market rules led to major lawsuits from different parties, leaving the electricity market in complete chaos.
The official government explanation for the crisis was the unexpected drought of the first months of 2001 that added to a series of unfavorable rain seasons in the previous years, leading to the acute water shortage of 2001. However, critics of the reforms argued that the crisis was in fact the consequence of mis-designed market rules. More specifically, they argued that the price from the market for contracts of electricity supply was not able to attract enough investments in new generation capacity. They also claimed that due to the high sunk costs and number of years required for the new plants to start operating, entry of new plants should be the result of a centralized decision and should not be left to a decentralized market.
In order to analyze how investments in new plants respond to different market conditions one would need information on prices and on the profitability of the plants and how investment in new plants followed. The problem is that even after the reforms, the electricity industry in Brazil (and mostly elsewhere) is characterized as being centralized and regulated (section 2 discusses the Brazilian market in more depth). The generation segment operates under centralized dispatch of an ISO (Independent System Operator) that calculates through the solution of a computer algorithm the cost of the water stored in each generation plant, and based on these results determines the production of each plant. Therefore, generators 2 Summer is the rain season for most part of Brazil.
do not determine the quantity they produce. Also, generators are paid according to their long term production capacity (called assured energy) instead of their actual production.
The spot market is a residual market that is used to adjust for short term fluctuations in demand and supply. Around 90 percent of the trade happens through bilateral contracts, which means that the spot price and quantity traded cannot be used to analyze the entry decisions of new plants, since they are not representative of the profitability of the plants.
The contract market is the only competitive segment in this industry. Unfortunately, the price of the contract is a strategic information for generators and distributors and hence are kept secret by the parties. However, the decision to enter the generation market is public information and well documented. The literature on empirical entry models in industrial organization (Bresnahan and Reiss [6] and [7] , Berry [4] among others) provides a way to estimate the profit function of the entrant firms based solely on entry data, without having information on prices and quantities. This is the method I follow in this paper.
However, when using the entry decisions to identify the profit function one needs to take into account one characteristic specific of hydroelectric generation: the externality in production. The externality arises from the fact that the operation of a generation plant regularizes the river flow downstream, since it stores water during the rain season and release it while generating electricity during the dry season. Other generation plants located downstream on the same river benefit from this regularization, since the upstream plant is in fact storing water for all the other plants located downstream. A generator that otherwise would need a large reservoir to store water from one season to another, can have an equivalent production with a smaller reservoir if there is a plant operating upstream.
This paper develops an entry model that takes this interaction into account. In this context, the externality is well defined and it is a function of the decrease in the variance of the river flow. The technological characteristics of the production process gives rise to a well defined pattern of how the externality is generated and how it affects the other plants. I take advantage of these characteristics to propose a econometric method that is computationally simpler than more standard entry models and does not suffer from the common problem of multiplicity of equilibria in entry games (see Berry [4] , Seim [16] or more recently Andrews et al [1] for more on the problem of multiplicity of equilibria).
This work relates to the empirical literature on entry models in industrial organization.
There is a large literature on this field, most of them using entry decisions to access market power: Bresnahan and Reiss [6] and [7] , Berry [4] etc. However, it has a closer analogy to the work of Seim [16] and Mazzeo [13] , where the decision to enter is made together with a location decision. The location can refer either to a product or a geographical space. The location decision in their models is driven by the trade off between differentiating and locating closer to higher demand locations; the degree of competition among products depends on the distance between competitors. The analogy with the problem studied here is that firms also decide if enter and where to locate. However, the location choices here are with respect to production and costs, and they depend on the physical characteristics of the locations and on the externality of production among the generators.
Analyzing the externality of entry decisions, the paper by Gowrisankaran and Stavins [10] estimate the externality associated with the adoption of new technology by banks. In their paper, the adoption of the new technology influences other banks decisions; banks that do not adopt the new technology are not able to carry certain types of transactions with other banks. While similar to this work for dealing with the problem of entry and externality instead of market power, their paper does not deal with the location problem as done by Seim [16] and Mazzeo [13] . In this paper I combine the two problems, with the externality of one agent's entry decision influencing the location decisions of other agents.
This paper also relates to the literature in spatial competition. Case et al [8] analyze the continuous case where neighboring states compete in the amount of public expenditures.
Dealing with a spatial discrete choice problem, or spatial logit, Murdoch et al [14] estimate a model where countries have to decide to join an environmental agreement, with the decision of a country having a negative externality on neighbor countries.
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Finally, there is a large literature about the actual performance of restructured electricity markets, with several papers trying to analyze different aspects of these markets. Borenstein et al [5] uses a method that decompose the wholesale price of the California market into costs, infra marginal rents, and market power gains to evaluate market inefficiencies during the energy crisis of the year 2000. 4 Wolfran [19] analyzes bid behavior in the British wholesale market to identify departures from the competitive price. Ishii and Yan [12] look at the effect of changes in regulatory institutions on the option value of investing on new plants. These and many other papers use methodologies that rely on information on price quantity and costs to quantify market inefficiencies. The method I use in this paper requires only data on entry decision to assess market performance.
The paper is organized as follows. 
The Brazilian Electricity Industry
The Brazilian system is a predominantly hydroelectric system with approximately 90% of all electricity generated hydrolically, with the remaining capacity generated thermally.
The generation system is operated under centralized dispatch (electricity production) by an ISO (Independent System Operator) that is responsible for the dispatch of the generation plants. A computer algorithm calculates the optimal dispatch by minimizing the probability of future water shortages. As a result, the ISO computes the opportunity cost of the water for each plant and schedule the electricity production in a merit order: the plants are ordered according to its water's cost and the one with the lowest opportunity cost of water are the first to be dispatched, with more plants being added to the process up to the point where supply meets demand. The cost of water of the last plant added to the dispatch, the one with highest cost, is the marginal cost of the system and also the spot price used to clear the transactions made on the spot market.
The consumers and generators are required by law to contract at least 90% of the energy consumed or produced. So, most of the electricity is traded through long term bilateral contracts negotiated between generators and consumers, usually distribution companies or large users. The amount produced or consumed above of what is contracted is cleared on the spot market, under the spot price, which works as a residual market for the smaller portion of the non-contracted energy. Therefore, a generator sell its electricity under (at least) two different prices: the price stated on the contract for the contracted part of its energy and the spot price for the non-contracted part.
The use of centralized production decisions and a long term contract market is somewhat problematic, since the amount contracted by the generators are not taken in to account by the ISO when it calculates the optimal dispatch. It creates the risk of a generator contracting a certain amount per period and not been chose by the ISO to produce on some of these periods, obligating him to buy the energy on the spot market. According to people from the industry, the exposition of the industry players to the high volatility of the spot price increases the risk to levels considered too costly for the industry. This fact lead to the adoption of a risk sharing mechanism called MRE (Mecanismo de Realocacão de Energia, or Mechanism to Relocate Energy). Von Der Fehr and Wolak [18] present an interesting discussion about the merits and problems of the MRE.
The MRE is a payment scheme where the energy produced by all plants is pooled together and allocated to generators in proportion to their long term production capacity, also called assured energy (energia assegurada). The assured energy represents the maximum amount a plant can produce over time with no more than 5% of probability of not being able to deliver this amount, and it is the key parameter of a plant. In this way, generators are not paid by their actual production but by their assured energy. The assured energy is also the maximum amount of electricity per period that a generator can contract with the distribution companies.
To clarify how the Brazilian system works, consider the following example with only two generators, G1 and G2, and one distributor, D. Let's restrict the problem first to how the system sets the quantity for each generator. Suppose the assured energy of G1 and G2 is 100 and 50, respectively.
First, consider a situation in which the total production is 200, with G1 producing 110
MWh and G2 producing 90 MWh. 5 The MRE allocates 2/3 of the total energy produced to G1 and 1/3 to G2, since that is their proportion of the total assured energy of the system. Therefore, according to the MRE the closure of the system happens with G1 producing 133 and G2 producing 67. A second type of situation happens when demand is less than the aggregated assured energy. For example, when G1 produces 50 and G2 produces 40.
The same logic follows with both generators receiving proportional to their assured energy relative to the system's aggregate: 2/3 and 1/3 of the total production. The MRE sets 60
and 30 for G1 and G2, respectively. Now consider the financial closure of the system, that is the quantity and price setting 5 I assume that the total quantity produced always equals the demand, otherwise the system collapses. In summary, the actual quantity produced by a plant does not affect its profits, since the amount the plant is paid for is determined by the MRE and depends on the plant assured energy. Also, most of the trade happens at the contract price, and the spot market works as a residual market for unexpected fluctuations in demand.
There are 4 sub-markets within the Brazilian market: North, South, Southeast/West
Central and Northeast. The sub-markets are defined due to significant restrictions on the transmission lines between the regions, compared to no significant restrictions within it. The sub-markets can have different prices due to transmission constraints on peak times.
Investment in hydroelectric generation is done through a concession process where investors submit bids for the right to explore the hydroelectric potential of a given location.
The available locations come from a list of possible locations provided by ANEEL (Agencia Nacional de Energia Eletrica), which is the government body that regulates the electric industry. When investors show interest in a specific location, a public concession process takes place, with several investors submitting technical proposals and bids for that location.
Among the technical proposals that qualify, the greatest bid wins the right to build and operate the plant for the next thirty or forty years.
The and that congestion happens only between different regions, we can assume that there is a unique contracted price within each region at each period. 6 
Externality in Production
Generation plants located on the same river have production externalities among each other, with generators located upstream regularizing the river flow for generators located downstream. Before trying to estimate the effect of this externality on the entry probability I present a theoretical model of two generators operating on the same river to show that 6 Electricity can be considered a homogeneous good up to the fact that there are transmission losses when transmitting for long distances and congestions between regions.
the operation of the plant located upstream creates a positive externality, increasing the profitability of the plant located downstream. I also present some characteristics of this externality which will be used in the next section to define the functional form of the externality in the empirical estimation.
I consider the case of a generator that decides its own production, as opposed to operate under centralized dispatch. It simplifies the problem, since in the decentralized case each generator decides production by maximizing its own utility.
7 Although different, the two problems are close, with the difference between the optimal policies of the two problems being due to the externality, that is taken into account in the centralized dispatch case. The effect of the externality can be seen in both problems. I assume that prices are given for the generators, ruling out any type of strategic behavior to try to affect prices and market conditions. This assumption is reasonable in the case of a sizable market with a large number of generators connected to a transmission grid that covers different regions without major transmission constraints. It approximates the conditions found in Brazil.
9
The problem analyzed here consists of two generators located in cascade on the same river, with generator 1 located upstream from plant 2, as shown in Figure 1 . I represent the river by D discrete points. The amount of rain that falls in each period at every point along the river is represented by a stochastic variable , with f ( ) being its probability density.
For simplicity, rain is iid both geographically and across time.
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The amount of water that reaches the reservoir of generator 1 is given by the amount of rain that falls upstream from plant 1. Generator 2 is located at the end of the river with generator 1 located at a distance of d from generator 2. The river spring is at a distance D from plant 2, as shown in Figure 1 . The amount of rain that reaches plant 1 is given by
On the other hand, the water that reaches generator 2 is the sum of the water used by generator 1 to produce electricity and the amount of rain that falls on the stretch of river that lies between the two plants. The amount of water that reaches generator 2's dam
The chronological order of events is the following: it rains at the beginning of the period, at the end of the period electricity production takes place and the remaining water on the reservoir will be the initial stock in the next period. The water used by plant 1 reaches plant 2 on the same period.
To simplify the analysis, I assume a one to one relation between water and energy produced. It means that one unit of water stored in the reservoir produces one unit of energy.
In fact, a more realistic production function is nonlinear in the height of the water surface relative to the turbine located at the base of the reservoir. Taking this into account implies that the productivity of a unit of water changes with the state of the dam. I abstract away from these technical consideration in this work.
The production of generators 1 and 2 is constrained by the amount of water they have in their reservoirs and by the amount of rain that falls in the period. The amount of water in the dam is constrained by the maximum storage capacity of the reservoir, as given by the following inequalities:
Where q i is the quantity produced, X i is the amount of water stored in the dam, r i is without changing the main results of the model. the amount of water that reaches the plant in one period andX i is the maximum storage capacity of the reservoir. It is important to note that electricity can be produced by using both water stored in the reservoir and/or the river flow in location i given by r i . It implies that a generation plant with a reservoir of size zero,X i = 0, must have X i = 0 and q i ≤ r i .
The law of motion of the amount of water stored in reservoir i is given by,
where the inequality sign represents the possibility that the reservoir spills water if it is full, X =X. In the law of motion of generator 2, r 2 depends on plant's 1 production plus the rain that falls between the two plants.
Let p be the price of electricity in a given period, and g(p) its probability distribution.
Also, let C(q) be the cost function of the plant, with C > 0 and C > 0. Convexity of costs here can be justified based on capacity constraints in the production process. The fact that distinct dimensions of a generation plant, such as the volume of the dam and the maximum generation capacity, have distinct capacity constraints, makes a differentiable convex cost curve to be a reasonable approximation to this technology. A generator maximizes profit by solving the following dynamic programming problem:
Subject to equations (1) (2) and (3).
Equation (4) is the Bellman equation solved by the generator to determine its optimal policy. The expectation of the future value is taking with respect to the probability distribution of rain fall and price.
In order to show that the effect of the externality is positive, we need to verify that (i) the smaller variance (regularization) of the river due to the operation of plant 1 upstream increases the production of generator 2 and (ii) that the optimal production policy of generator 1 regularizes the river flow.
Proposition 1
The regularization of the river flow by generator 1 (upstream) increases the value of generator 2 (downstream).
Proof. In order to show that the value of generator 2 increases with the operation of generator 1, it is sufficient to show that a generator's value function is concave. Recall that the amount of water that flows through plant 2 is the same both with or without plant 1 upstream.
Define π = pq − C(q), and the operator T such that
If π is real valued, continuous, concave and bounded, and the set S = X, X , q : X ≤ X + r − q is convex and compact, then the operator T maps a continuous bounded function V in to a continuous bounded function T V , and it satisfies the Blackwell's sufficient conditions to be a contraction mapping. Stokey and Lucas with Prescott [17] show that T maps concave functions into concave functions, and therefore the solution to V = T V is a concave function.
Therefore, we only need to show that these properties hold in these cases in order to be able to apply their results here.
Since p, q ∈ R and C > 0, we have that π is indeed a real valued, continuous and concave function. Boundedness comes from the fact that the monopoly profit bounds this function above and the possibility of shutting down in face of negative profit bounds it below. The set S is clearly convex and compact.
Proposition 2 The optimal policy of generator 1 located upstream, regularizes (reduces the variance) the river flow.
Proof. We want to show that the variance of the optimal policy q * is smaller than the variance of rainfall r. For this purpose it is sufficient to show that 0 < ∂q * /∂r < 1.
Considering the case where the law of motion binds and substituting it into the Bellman equation we have,
The first order condition gives,
Applying the implicit function theorem,
Using the fact that the value function is concave and the cost function is convex we have 0 < ∂q * /∂r < 1.
Theorem 1
The production of electricity by a generator located in a given river has a positive externality on the generators located downstream on the same river.
Proof. If the production of a generator upstream regularizes the river flow, it increases the value of generators downstream as long as their value functions are concave. Propositions 1 and 2 show that both conditions hold.
The idea is that the reservoir of generator 1 is in fact holding water for generator 2 as well. Generator 1 holds water in the rain season and release it during the dry season. This is a positive externality of the first generator's reservoir management. The regularization of the water inflow into generator 2, as compared to the greater variance of the occurrence of rains, is the externality of the operation of generator 1 upstream. It is important to note that as much as this result depends on the technological characteristics of production in this industry, it also depends on the fact that generators upstream are maximizing profits and on the assumption that the price is exogenous.
One corollary of this result is that the effect of the externality of the operation of 1 in 2 depends on the distance between the two plants. The closer plant 1 locates to plant 2 the higher the effect of the externality, since a smaller stretch of the river will be subject to the higher variance of the rain pattern. To see this consider the case where plant 1 can locate in two different points along the river, r and r , with r more downstream than r. Since each distance measure along the river has a one to one relationship with the amount of rain that falls downstream from this point, without loss of generality, normalize the expected amount of rain that falls in each location to one,¯ = 1. With this normalization r and r now are also equal to the expected amount of rain that falls downstream from them. The following corollary states it formally.
Corollary 2 The effect of the externality generated by a plant upstream decreases as the distance between the plants increase.
Proof. Since r < r we want to show that V ar(r) + V ar(q * 
An Entry Model with Externality
Ideally, an entry model for the electricity industry would take into account not only the externality in production but also the effect of entry on equilibrium prices, as it is done in the traditional literature, like Bresnahan and Reiss [6] and [7] , and Berry [4] . These papers use data from many different markets in order to access the effect of entry on market power.
Two reasons forbids me to pursue such a model. The first is that since the Brazilian electric system is connect through a transmission grid, which except for occasional congestion in peak times between the sub-markets SE-WC, N, NE and S, it can be considered as one large market with only equilibrium price for the whole market. Therefore, there is not enough observations on markets in the data to try to estimate such a model. Even considering each year as one independent market, it is not enough to estimate such effect. I assume that at each available location there is a potential entrant that in a given period can choose between entering or not. If the agent decides to enter she will sign the contract that will set the price for the following years, build the plant, operate it and get the pay off of selling the electricity. If she decides not to enter she will not have the option to enter in the next period. In other words, agents have only one opportunity to enter.
This assumption greatly simplifies the problem since it avoids any dynamic consideration on the timing of the entry decision, and it is based on the fact that there is no real value of waiting to enter in this industry. This can be justified by two specificities of this industry.
First, the value of waiting (also known as option value) derives from the fact that enter can be made in a subsequent period if market conditions improve. It requires an agent to be able to make the decision about entry in the next period. But it is not necessarily the case here, since a different entrant can enter at that specific location. The reason for this is the limited number of locations available for entry, and the impossibility of being the only possible entrant in a given location. It reduces the value of waiting to zero, since not entering now does not guarantee the right to make the same decision next period. The second reason is that the waiting value is based on the trade off between entering now or in the future.
Since most of the entrants in this industry are large firms with several plants operating in different locations, entering now in a given location does not prevent entry in the future.
Therefore, a more reasonable assumption is to assume that agents enter every time there exists a positive profit opportunity in a given location. Without the identity of the entrants, it is equivalent to assuming that agents last only for one period.
I also assume that entrants are differentiated in their ability to operate a plant and sell the electricity produced in a specific location. And that this ability is not observed by the other entrants or by the econometrician. In fact, entrants are identical in the observable characteristics but distinct in the unobservable characteristics. This unobserved characteristic is private information of the entrant, which introduces asymmetry of information into the problem. This assumption implies that the profit of a generator i is determined by two distinct components: an observable part Ω jt , a function of the plant's characteristics and time, and an unobservable part µ j + ε jt , that account both the unobserved characteristics of the location and the specific ability of the entrant to operate the plant. The unobserved characteristics of the locations are observed by the entrants but not by the econometrician.
The profit function can then be written as
It makes the entry problem an incomplete information game where players form expectations about the other players' profits and actions. The solution concept used is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium where strategies are ex-ante optimal. This is the same concept used in Seim's [16] study of the video retail industry. In this type of equilibrium there can be expost regret about the entry decision. This type of assumption is especially reasonable in industries with high sunk costs as electricity generation, due to the mispracticality of reverting investments in new facilities. Ex-post regret only occurs in entry games with complete information if players use mixed strategy.
The idiosyncratic ability of the entrants ε represents the type of the entrant in the asymmetric information problem, which is modeled as an iid random variable with probability density h(ε). Agents will form expectation about other agent's actions based on the distri-
There is a list of J different locations available {1, ...J}. The locations chosen in period t will not be available in t + 1. Let π jt be the long term profit of entering location j in period
t. An agent will enter in location j if the profit of entering is greater than zero. The decision to enter in location j in period t is given by,
The Functional Form of the Profit Function
The investment decision is based on the expected long term profit, as shown in equation 6 . Two important institutional features of the Brazilian market imply a specific functional form for the profit function. First, most of the energy is traded through long term bilateral contracts, implying that the price used to calculate the discounted cash flow is fixed on the relevant time horizon. This is important since it excludes uncertainty about future prices.
And second, under the MRE, generators do not get paid according to their productions but according to their assured energy, which is fixed for long periods of time. These features significantly simplify the analysis since the payments received by a generator do not depend on her current stock of water or on the expected rain.
The profit function of an agent entering in location j in period t is given by
Where Z j is the set of characteristics that affect both the profitability and the investment cost of the plant, Ext jt is the externality that generators upstream from j generate in period t, φ t is the time effect on the profitability of the plants, µ j is an unobserved by the econometrician characteristic of the plant and ε jt is the unobserved type of the entrant that affects profit.
It is worth noting that the fact that the contract keeps the price fixed for the relevant The contract price is a private information for generators and consumers, not being revealed by them. The year dummies capture the market conditions for each year, therefore including the effect of price and risk on the profitability.
The functional form of the profit function becomes,
Note that ε jt is indexed on t since on each period a different entrant with different ability can choose to enter the market. I also assume that ε jt has a type I extreme value distribution and µ j is distributed as a normal with mean c and variance
To model the externality effect I separate it in two components: the first is the regular- 
Generalizing to the case of several plants upstream, the externality of plant j becomes
Where ∆ j is the set of locations upstream from location j, and the additive assumption is based on the fact the water stored in all upstream dams are increasing the profitability of location j, then the assumption they should be summed.
Define P it as the probability of an entrant entering in location i upstream in period t.
The expected externality that generator j will have in period t is,
If at the beginning of period t there is already a plant operating in one or more of the upstream locations, P it = 1 for these locations.
After defining the functional form of the profit and the externality function, the next step is to calculate the entry probability which will be used in the estimation procedure.
The Entry Probability
In order to illustrate how the probability of entry is calculated and some features of the equilibrium of the entry game I first show the entry problem of one generator with no plants or locations upstream, then I show the case of a generator with only one plant upstream and then the generalization to the case of N plants.
In the case of a generator with no possible location for plants upriver, the decision to enter depends on its own profitability only. A potential entrant in location i enters in period t if π it > 0. Given µ i , the probability of entering is,
. (12) Where Ω it = Z i β + φ t is the observable part of profits. Since I assume ε to have a type 1 extreme value distribution, given the vector of parameters β the conditional entry probability becomes
The decision of a second generator between entering or not in a location j downstream depends on the decision of generator i upstream. Since the entrant in j does not know what the entrant in i will do in period t, her decision is based on her assessment of the probability that i enters and the expected profit derived from it. The expected profit of an entrant in j in time t becomes,
Therefore, the conditional entry probability in j is
Consider now the case of N locations on the same river, and order the plants such that the most upstream plant is 1, the second most upstream is 2 and so on. Given the vector Z of plant characteristics, the year effects and the coefficients of the model we can write the probabilities of these plants as a system of equations:
It is easy to see that this system can be solved in a recursive fashion: calculate P 1t first, then use P 1t to find P 2t and so on. The fact that the system can be solved in this way indicates that there is a unique solution to this problem, and therefore there is no multiplicity of equilibria in the entry game. Heckman [11] For each different river basin I solve for the probabilities using the system described in (17) . After solving for the conditional entry probabilities for all periods in the sample, the conditional probability of the observed sequence of entry decision in location j is defined as:
Since the ε's are iid over time, and y jt takes value 1 if entry happens and 0 otherwise. The unconditional probability can be obtained by integrating out the probability distribution of µ:
Since I assume that µ is distributed as a normal N(c,σ 2 ), the integral in (18) needs to be numerically calculated.
Finally, the likelihood function that is taken to the data is:
It is important to note that the interaction among the firm's actions is limited to entry on The distance between plants/locations on the same river I calculated using the polar coordinates from each plant, an information contained in the SIPOT database. The fact that rivers wind around the landscape makes the distance between two plants when following the river to be significantly more than if measured as the distance of two points on the Earth surface. So to calculate these distances I marked the coordinates of the plants on Google
Earth and draw paths following the river curse to find the distance between the plants.
12 Table 1 summarizes the main explanatory variables used in the estimation. Power is the installed capacity of a generator and affects its maximum production capacity, as well as the installation costs. Height is the distance between the highest possible water level to the base of the water fall. Area is the area of the dam when it is full. N NE S and SE/WC are dummy for the different regions of the country, and they compare to the Southeast-West Central region, that I take to be the base region. The main demand centers are located on the Southeast, the more populated and industrialized region. I group together SE and WC since they are electrically well integrated, without transmission restrictions between the two regions. DistSIN is the distance between the generator and the main transmission line. Since investors are required to build the connection to the main transmission lines, it accounts for the cost of building the connection. Table 2 shows the distribution of the number of firms and entry over the years covered by the sample. Table 3 gives the maximum likelihood estimates of the full model defined in equation (19) . The table presents the results of the full model and the results from the model without the random effects. The full model has higher coefficients than the model with no random effects.
All coefficients have the expected sign. Power is related both to the production capacity 7 Discussion of Results and Assumptions
Externality
The externality has a positive effect on entry decisions and it is an increasing function of the regularization of the river flow done by the upstream plants. As a way to understand the meaning of the estimated coefficient of the externality I calculate the entry probability for the locations available on the Uruguay river basin in southern Brazil. One possibility is that the model is simply capturing the fact that firms are more likely to be built at the end of long rivers, something that may be due to the externality but may also be caused by something else. One alternative explanation of why plants would like to locate at the end of rivers is that these sites are closer to the ocean and to larger cities, which are the main consumer centers. It is not the case in Brazil, where most of the rivers then to the sea. Therefore, a dam site at the end of a river is more likely to be far from the Southeast than a site closer to the river spring.
If the externality really exists and matters, than it influences the ownership pattern of the dams: if all plants belong to the same firm than this firm captures all the externality it generates. Multi-plant firms will tend to have several plants on the same river to capture the benefit of the externality. The fact that the externality occurs from upstream to downstream plants makes the multi-plant firm to have an incentive to enter downstream after it enters a site upstream. In order to check if this is really the case, I use the ten firms that had the largest number of entry in my data set to see if the pattern of multiple entry on the same river follows. A brief look at the data is enough to see that this pattern exists and it is quite strong. Table 5 shows the number of entry of each firm and the number of rivers and subsidiaries where it occurred. The last column of the table shows the ratio plants per river.
It shows that all these firms had entered twice on at least one river, with some firms, Duke
Energy for example, having all its entry on the same river. 
Year Effects
An alternative explanation for the rise in the dummy coefficients of year 2000 and after is the fact that some institutional change brought credibility to the regulatory process and 
Entry Order
The data set has information about the entry order among the years of the sample. 14 It allows me to estimate the model using the entry order or, alternatively, disconsidering the entry order and assuming that everyone enters at the same time. This assumption is made on several empirical papers on entry, such as Berry [4] and Seim [16] . The usual reason for the simultaneous entry assumption is the fact that information on the entry order is not available.
The data set used in the estimation is an unbalanced panel, where an available location that is chosen in a given year does not appear on the sample in the next period. Ignoring the entry order is equivalent to getting rid of the panel structure of the data. Table 6 shows the results of three different estimations. The regression labeled 'Full Model' is the one already presented in the previous section. The 'Cross Sectional' model treats the entry problem as a one shot game, where everyone decides to enter at once. In this case, the temporal dimension of the data set is lost since all entrants are assumed to make the decision at the same time.
The model labeled 'Entry Order' takes into account the entry order but does not include the year dummies, to facilitate comparison with the cross sectional specification.
The results show that ignoring the entry order significantly change the coefficient of the externality. The value of the coefficient of Ext goes from 0.30 in the full model to 0.67 in the static model. This is not an artifact of the year dummies, since the model without the year dummies gives estimates close to the ones from the full model. The over estimation of the Ext coefficient reflects the fact that entry did not happen most of the time; several sites with a plant operating upstream had entry on the last years of the sample or had no entry at all.
On a static model that disconsider the entry order, a site that had entry only in 2002 is not 14 There is no information on the entry order within a year. site where entry happened in 2002 than the static model would give a higher weight to the externality from the upstream plant, while the model using information on the entry order would take into account the fact that entry did not happen immediately and therefore give a lower weight to the externality effect.
The same argument can be applied to the entry papers that estimate market power using a static model. The difference is that on their cases the negative effect on profits of having another competitor in the market is underestimated by the static model: the effect of having one incumbent firm in the market may be to postpone entry for some time, but finally happening in some future period, something that a static model would not capture. Distance from the main transmission lines implies the cost of building the connection to the main system, and it is an important factor on the location decision.
The model provides estimates of the change in market conditions for the different years covered by the sample. These estimates show a high coefficient already in year 2000, one year before the crisis of 2001, when spot prices reached unprecedent high levels (see Figure 3 ). It indicates that the contract market anticipated the excess demand that would be generated by the water shortage. This conclusion has three strong implications. First, as already mentioned it indicates that the crisis was not an unexpected event. Second, and more important, it points out that there was a response in new entry due to a rising expectation of a supply shortage in the future. It supports the effectiveness of the contract market as a decentralized mechanism to attract and allocate investments in new plants, going against the view that the crisis was a problem of misdesigned market institutions. In fact, the crisis happened due to the length of time that the new plants require to begin operating, since the length of time for a medium sized plant to start operating is 5 to 7 years. Third, despite the fact that the market anticipated the crisis the centralized dispatch algorithm failed in preventing it. Few months before the crisis the ISO was still dispatching the hydro plants instead of turning on the thermo generators.
Finally, ignoring the entry order and treating the problem as a one shot game gives rise to misleading coefficients of the underlying problem. The estimation of a static entry game overestimates the effect of the interaction among the generators when compared to the result obtained from the model which takes the sequential order of entry into account. 
